Columna Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 19.08.2025 Steven K. Pifer, embajador® y académico norteamericano (Brookings Institution)
President Donald Trump traveled to Alaska on August 15 intending to get Russian President Vladimir Putin to agree to a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire. He returned home with no ceasefire but an “understanding” containing poison pills guaranteed to make it unacceptable to Ukraine.
August 18 went better. Trump’s meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and seven other European leaders left the Alaska understanding by the wayside. The nine discussed security guarantees for Ukraine, a crucial requirement for any settlement, and Trump pressed Putin to meet directly with his Ukrainian counterpart.
Russia has waged major war against Ukraine for some 42 months. Trump has expressed increasing exasperation of late as the Russians continued attacks on the front and on Ukrainian cities, but Putin ignored multiple deadlines set by Trump for the Kremlin to change its approach. When his last deadline expired on August 8, Trump imposed no penalties but announced the meeting with Putin in Alaska.
In the days before Alaska, Trump embraced the goal of a ceasefire as a basis for negotiation and threatened “severe consequences” if Putin said no. However, Putin rejected the idea, and Trump flipped, not pressing for a ceasefire or threatening new penalties. The two leaders instead discussed a broader “understanding” that got into the thorny question of land concessions.
That “understanding” reportedly would require that Kyiv withdraw its military from Donbas and cede that region to Russia as the entry price to begin negotiating a general settlement. One glaring trap: If the negotiation subsequently failed, Putin’s military would be far better placed to resume fighting, with Kyiv having handed over land and the defensive fortifications that have blunted the Russian offensive for more than three years. Other elements of the “understanding” included an end to some US sanctions on Russia and international recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
It was foolish to think such an arrangement would hold any appeal for Zelensky. Even were he inclined to agree, he would not be able to sell it at home. Putin undoubtedly understood this (if Trump did not) and would have welcomed any resulting divisions between Washington, on the one hand, and Ukraine and the Europeans, on the other.
Flying home, Trump debriefed Zelensky by phone and invited him to Washington on August 18 for further talks. He also debriefed key European leaders. The leaders of Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Finland, NATO, and the European Union flew to Washington, almost certainly intending to back Zelensky and try to move Trump in a different direction.
The White House discussions seem to have gone well, projected a degree of unity, and perhaps repaired some of the damage done in Alaska.
First, the badly-flawed Alaska “understanding” seems to have fallen by the wayside, at least for the time being. It does not appear that Trump pressed Zelensky or the others to accept it.
Second, Trump told Zelensky and the other European leaders that the United States would help with security guarantees for Ukraine if a settlement were reached. While he ruled out US ground forces, he later suggested that US air power could be involved. That could well provide the kind of American “backstop” that the British and French have sought for a coalition of the willing that would put European boots on the ground in Ukraine.
Security guarantees should be worked out between the West and Ukraine, not with Russia, but they are an essential piece for ending the Russia-Ukraine war. It is virtually impossible to see Ukrainians making the painful choice to accept Russian de facto occupation of some Ukrainian land without confidence that Putin would not launch a new assault in the future.
Third, Trump pressed Putin to meet Zelensky, calling for an early meeting between the two followed by a trilateral summit that he would join. On August 19, the White House stated that planning for the Putin-Zelensky meeting was “underway.” Getting Putin and Zelensky together will not prove easy—the Russian leader has sought to delegitimize his Ukrainian counterpart—but is essential. The Russian and Ukrainian leaders are the ones who will have to resolve the tough questions if a settlement is to be reached.
Fourth, European leaders pressed the value of a ceasefire as a necessary basis for a negotiation. They are correct, as Trump was before he flipped in Alaska. By all appearances, Putin believes the Russian army can win on the battlefield. If Russia and Ukraine were to negotiate without a ceasefire, how much incentive would Putin have to make concessions to achieve an agreement? Or would he simply drag out talks while his military pressed for victory?
Western security guarantees for Ukraine will not be a popular topic in Moscow, and the Kremlin’s readiness for a Putin-Zelensky meeting remains to be seen. On August 19, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov did not rule out bilateral or trilateral summits but stressed the need for careful preparation.
Looking forward, much remains up in the air. The Russians will undoubtedly prove difficult. The specifics of security guarantees have to be worked out. Trump might yet again flip.
However, Trump left Alaska having put the onus on Kyiv “to get it done.” The Washington discussions seemed to place more of the responsibility for ending the war on Moscow, where it rightfully belongs. Those who want to see a just and durable settlement have good grounds to feel better after August 18 than they did three days earlier.
