Artículo CISAC News, 26.08.2025 Steven K. Pifer, embajador ® y académico norteamericano (Brookings Institution)
The August 18 discussions involving President Trump, Ukrainian President Zelensky and seven other European leaders usefully focused on security guarantees for Ukraine in the event of a settlement of the Russia-Ukraine war. Ukrainians understandably want confidence that Russia will not renew the war at a future point.
European leaders came to Washington to bolster Zelensky’s position following Trump’s grievous Alaska conversation with Russian President Putin. Trump had said he would use the Alaska meeting to secure a ceasefire and, if Putin rejected it, he would impose “severe consequences.” Putin said no, escaped any consequences, and foisted an “understanding” on Trump that the American team should have recognized would be unacceptable to Kyiv.
The “understanding”—which among other things would have required Ukraine to cede territory just to start negotiations—appears to have fallen by the wayside during Trump’s talk with Zelensky and other European leaders. Good. Moreover, Trump’s position on security guarantees for Ukraine seems to have shifted. He later suggested U.S. air power could be on offer.
Strong security guarantees are important if Ukrainians are to have confidence that Russia will not launch a new assault after a couple of years regenerating its military. Solid guarantees may prove important for another reason. Giving up any Ukrainian territory, even if just on a de facto basis, is a painful issue for Ukrainians and a decision that only they can make. They are hardly likely to consider that difficult issue unless they believe the remainder of Ukraine will be secure.
Another Budapest Memorandum does not provide the answer. Russia blithely violated its commitments in that 1994 document to respect Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity and not to use force against Ukraine. Russia violated similar commitments in other agreements, such as the 1997 Ukraine-Russia Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation.
With that sorry history, Moscow does not deserve a seat at the table on this issue. On August 20, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov dismissed any security guarantees that did not involve Russia. He referred to a 2022 plan in which Russia sought to join Western and other countries as a guarantor of Ukraine’s security. However, the Russians proposed that any military action by the guarantors be taken only by consensus. That would have created the ludicrous possibility that Russia invades Ukraine, then vetoes action by the other guarantors.
Unfortunately, the White House said Washington is consulting with Moscow on “acceptable” security guarantees. That is a mistake. Anything acceptable to Moscow would not provide the guarantees that Kyiv needs.
In the event of a ceasefire, a package of security guarantees could include three elements. First, a large, standing military well-equipped with modern weaponry under Ukrainian command offers the best guarantee of Ukraine’s security. That could deter future attack by making clear that the Russians would face unbearable costs.
In 2023, individual NATO members began negotiating bilateral security agreements with Ukraine. By July 2024, Ukraine had concluded bilateral agreements with twenty countries and the European Union, and more have been signed since then. Among other things, these agreements commit Ukraine’s partners to provide defense articles, training, help in developing interoperability with NATO forces and similar actions.
Building on these arrangements, guarantors could make more definitive commitments to Kyiv, including to provide specific numbers of aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, etc., so that Ukraine could maintain a military armed with a large number of modern weapons. Guarantors could also help Ukraine develop a modern defense industrial base.
Second, the British and French have led discussions since February about a “Coalition of the Willing” that would deploy boots on the ground in Ukraine if there was a ceasefire or settlement. London and Paris, however, have made clear their desire for an American “backstop,” that is, some specialized support such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets and a commitment to support that force if it came under attack. Trump’s suggestion of airpower could provide precisely that backstop. Washington reportedly has begun discussing with European countries the kinds of U.S. support that could be provided for a European force that would deploy in Ukraine.
Third, NATO membership and its Article 5 (“an armed attack against one … shall be considered an attack against them all”) would provide a very strong guarantee for Ukraine’s security. Trump has ruled out NATO membership, but the Alliance’s formal position remains that Ukraine is on an “irreversible path” to membership.
While perhaps not possible in the near term, Ukraine’s future membership should remain a goal for both Kyiv and NATO. Trump would fail if he tried to assemble a consensus within the Alliance to abandon that element of its policy toward Ukraine, and he will not be in office after 2028. Moreover, Ukraine today has a large, innovative and battle-hardened army. It would be a provider as well as a consumer of NATO security.
Taken together, these elements could provide the basis for a strong security package for Kyiv.
To be sure, the Kremlin will not like any guarantees that confer real security on Ukraine. However, if Russia and Ukraine do negotiate a just and durable settlement—which will take time and require significant change in Russian policy—Moscow presumably would have decided to live in peace with Ukraine. So why should the Russians then care about security guarantees that would only be triggered if they chose to attack again?
