Author: Norbert Eitelhuber
Abstract
Abstract: This essay identifies the nature of Russia’s strategic culture: it is its propensity to use force to achieve strategic objectives. It argues that Western policymakers have consistently misperceived the reasons for Russian foreign policy behavior, as they fail to take into account the enduring nature of Russia’s strategic culture. This article claims that Russia has a strategic culture that is fairly stable, although significant changes occurred after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Most importantly, Russia’s imperial ambitions vanished, along with the desire to spread an ideology. The role of military strength as a source of power declined, while the prominence of economic power increased. In the post-Cold War era, Russia has aimed at restoring its status within a great power order, improving the standard of living for its people, and developing (or revising) its national identity. At the same time, the strategic culture that prevails in Moscow makes Russia particularly sensitive to actions taken by the West. The article concludes by examining opportunities for accommodation and constructive engagement with Russia. To attenuate the tensions that currently exist, the West should react assertively but moderately to rhetorical saber rattling and other provocations, and engage in constructive cooperation on both contemporary security threats and economic issues, including pursuing close cooperation to mitigate the effects of the international financial crisis on Russia. In the near term, the West should focus on working with Russia to develop a new concept for long-term security and stability in Eurasia. Future research should thus focus on forward-looking networked diplomacy approaches that may be suited to overcome a Cold War mindset oriented toward bloc confrontation.
Introduction
Russia’s military incursion into Georgia in August 2008 took many experts by surprise. In its wake, policymakers and scholars began to speculate about Russia’s true motives. The Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, stoked fears of a return of an imperialistic Russia that would “rebuild its empire, seize greater control of Europe’s energy supplies and punish those who believed democracy could flourish.” He also asked, “If Moscow can oust Georgia’s democratically elected government, it can then intimidate other democratic European governments. Where will this end?”1 Some pundits already see Russia’s Georgia strategy being replicated in the Ukraine, and hear echoes of the
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Soviet Union’s invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Other experts point out that “it is more likely that Russia’s strategic aims are modest, largely confined to its own neighborhood, and typical for a major power.”2 According to this more sanguine view, Moscow’s decision to send troops into Georgia is rather seen as a reaction to the policies that the United States and NATO have pursued in the post-Soviet space.
The policy implications that would proceed from these two points of view are entirely different. In the first case, the liberal democracies in the Euro-Atlantic sphere with market economies—which will be collectively referred to in this article as “the West”—would have to repel further Russian aggression with all means possible, and would be forced to band together against a resurgent Russia. In the second case, cooperation with Russia on the international stage to solve global problems would probably be the more constructive approach; this might even go as far as accepting that Russia has privileged interests in the region of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
This essay will examine these different perceptions scientifically by drawing on the concept of strategic culture. This concept may provide an explanatory framework for what can often seem to be irrational Russian foreign and security policy decisions. It may thus serve as a tool for policymakers to help define a Western policy towards Russia that can lead to cooperation instead of confrontation. Russia has a strategic culture that is deeply rooted in its history and geography, one that is fairly stable with respect to the prevailing threat perception and Russia’s quest for great power status. However, this strategic culture did undergo some notable changes after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when Russia’s imperial ambitions subsided and the role of military strength as a source of power declined, being replaced by a new focus on economic power.
This article is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Russian strategic culture. Rather, I use it as a basis for analyzing Russia’s behavior in the post-Cold War era, particularly regarding its strategic aims toward the West, through an examination of Russian strategic and doctrinal papers, as well as statements of Russian leaders. Special emphasis will be placed on the changing perception of military power versus economic power, because this is the area in which the most significant changes in Russia’s strategic culture have taken place. Ultimately, having abandoned its mission to spread Communist ideology, Russia is simply behaving like any other great power that is trying to find its place after having gained in relative strength. At the same time, however, Russia is particularly sensitive to Western actions due to its strategic culture, and feels challenged by Western goals of promoting liberal democracies and market economies.
Among the strategic implications for the West that this analysis suggests is that it is possible for the West to engage in compromise and constructive engagement with Russia. In a globalized world, it is just as much in Russia’s interest as it is in the interest of the West to not isolate Russia, but rather to respect its geopolitical role and give it its say on the international stage. In the long run, there is a chance to overcome the mindset of the Cold War era that pitted a monolithic Eastern Bloc against the democratic West. The acceptance of the idea of special spheres of interest for either the EU or Russia would be severely counterproductive to this aim, because it would cement the notion of a divided Europe.