Columna The Hill, 07.09.2025 William H. Courtney (embajador ® y académico norteamericano-RAND) y Michael Cecire (investigador-RAND)
After the summit in Alaska between President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, U.S. and Western policy toward Russia is again resembling its contours in times of past strain. Since World War II, the West has faced numerous challenges in deterring nuclear use, containing risks, and seeking limited cooperation.
At times, depending on the nature of tensions, the mix of policies toward Moscow changes, less so their essence.
Except for hard-headed leaders such as Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan, most U.S. presidents enter office hoping or expecting to ease tensions with Moscow. But unpleasant events or political realities often compel them to lower expectations or toughen up.
What causes this shift?
For one, presidents can be naive. Franklin Roosevelt hoped Soviet agreement to join the United Nations would foster post-war peace. But Stalin was focused on subduing Eastern Europe, which launched the Cold War. Jimmy Carter wrote dissident Andrei Sakharov; weeks later, a furious Kremlin rejected his call for deep cuts in nuclear arms. George W. Bush got a “sense of (Putin's) soul” but read it wrongly.
Second, a lack of realism can trip up presidents. Richard Nixon reasoned that détente might spur the Soviet Union to lessen support for North Vietnam; it did not. Reagan and Barack Obama stirred allied unease by speaking of a world without nuclear weapons; they settled for still-valuable treaties reducing strategic arms.
Finally, Moscow's bad behavior can harden presidents. Insurgencies in Greece and Turkey spurred Truman to aid nations threatened by communist subversion. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter embargoed sales of U.S. grain to the food-short Soviet Union. A Soviet buildup of nuclear arms led Reagan to augment U.S. forces. When Moscow threatened to punish Poland and quash the Solidarity free trade union, Carter and Reagan gave them support.
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led the West to impose sweeping sanctions and send large-scale aid to Kyiv. Trump and Biden had nursed hopes for better ties with Moscow, but its war prevented this. Putin showed no interest in serious peace talks with Biden, and he rejected Trump's proposal for a 30-day cease-fire.
Relations with Russia today are roughly where they were during the tense early 1980s, after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, threatened Poland, and hurled nuclear bombast at Europe. Human rights brutality stifled society, as it does now.
Nuclear deterrence has not lost its importance. As in the Reagan era, Washington is again following Moscow in modernizing strategic forces. One difference is the imbalance in Europe of theater and tactical nuclear forces in favor of Moscow.
Containment remains central to Western policy. Just as the United States aided the Afghan resistance in the 1980s and banned U.S. participation in the 1980 Moscow Olympics, the West now supports Ukraine and sanctions Russia. Europe is increasingly important as it takes a tougher line on Ukraine. The West again faces the challenge of countering intense Kremlin disinformation and subterfuge.
The international space station is an example of limited cooperation. Washington and Moscow have just agreed to extend its operation until 2028. Sadly, most educational and cultural exchanges have ended as Russia intensifies its crackdown on personal freedoms and wages war in Ukraine.
Contemporary Russia and Putin's despotic regime are largely incompatible with conciliatory diplomacy. Moscow's posture is rooted in a revanchist vision for its periphery, and a hostile or at best zero-sum stance toward the prosperous and democratic West. Russia has cheated on arms control accords. The Kremlin shows little interest in good-faith negotiation on matters it views as core, such as Ukraine and Eastern Europe. It views cease-fires not as steppingstones toward compromise, but impediments to military operations. Putin's Russia pursues peace not as a stable end state but a temporary breather in a longer cycle of confrontation.
These realities may seem harsh, but over time Western policy toward Moscow has adapted to multiple sources of antagonism. As it does today.
