Artículo World Politics Review, 08.07.2025 Mary Gallagher, decana del Keough School of Global Affairs (U. de Notre Dame)
In recent weeks, speculation became rife among overseas Chinese analysts and the tabloid media about the status of Chinese President Xi Jinping, prompted by a brief period of inactivity for Xi in May and early June. These rumors were further fed by continued purges of high-ranking military officials, including some promoted by Xi himself, and the announcement that Xi would not attend this week’s BRICS Summit in Brazil.
The speculation ranged from suggestions that there is internal resistance in Beijing to Xi’s rule to reports that he is suffering from health problems and may step down from his three roles as China’s paramount leader—Communist Party chief, president and head of the military—as early as August. These reports included misinterpretations and errors of fact, but that did not stop them from fueling further speculation and attempts at more analysis along similar lines.
Given China’s importance to the world economy and its ongoing competition with the United States for global power and legitimacy, the opaqueness of China’s political system and its lack of an institutionalized process for political succession are problems with global implications.
When Xi removed term limits for the state presidency in 2018 at the beginning of what would have been his second and last term, he discontinued a shaky but important attempt to limit China’s paramount leader to two five-year terms. The term limits were intended to avoid the centralized and personalist rule that characterized the tenure of Mao Zedong, and instead encourage collectivist decision-making by the party leadership. They were more or less honored by Xi’s two predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, both of whom were selected by Deng to succeed him after he stepped down from his formal leadership role in 1989.
Abrogation of the two-term limit allowed Xi to further centralize power around himself and rule indefinitely. The fact that he accomplished this feat after only five years in office may indicate that many Communist Party leaders had grown dissatisfied with the two-term rule. Xi himself argued that it created weak leaders and lame-duck status in the second term.
Centralization has allowed Xi to rule over an anti-corruption campaign of monumental proportions; to discipline and silence private sector entrepreneurs who spoke out against the Party, such as Jack Ma and Ren Zhiqiang; and to enforce draconian policies, such as China’s “Zero COVID” strategy, which locked people in their homes for weeks on end during the pandemic. China’s bureaucracy, private sector and civil society have all been tamed into a docility thought nearly impossible at the beginning of his term as party chairman in 2012.
But the rumors and speculation that currently dog Xi’s rule will only continue to get worse as he ages. Centralization without institutionalized succession does not bode well for China’s policymaking over the next decade. When Xi’s third term ends in 2028, he will be 75. Each time something unusual happens with regard to Xi’s public appearances, there will be speculation about his health and his grasp on power, as well as about how the next paramount leader will be chosen in a system that disavows the use of elections to make such selections.
Xi may fear that any attempt to choose a successor or plan a transition would lead to open conflict among China’s elite. But the lack of transparency at the top of China’s political system has its own costs.
Autocracies are sometimes portrayed as more stable than democracies because leadership turnover is usually less frequent, meaning there is less uncertainty about who will be in power and the policies they will pursue. But unlike the uncertainty that pervades democracies, from the timing of elections and electoral outcomes to policy continuity across governments, political succession in autocracies in general, and in China in particular, is entirely uncertain. We don’t know when it will occur; we don’t know how it will occur; and because Xi has refused to groom a chosen successor, we don’t know who his replacement will be or even whether one currently exists.
This uncertainty over the process grows more important as Xi ages. It is ironic that a leader who has presided over the strengthening of the Chinese Communist Party by reducing corruption and formulating rules to enhance coordination of party organizations has not provided any mechanisms to transfer power. This may be due in large part to Xi’s own rise to power, which was the first CCP leadership transition that did not include input from Deng, who continued to preside informally over China’s post-Mao reforms until his death in 1997.
Xi’s ascendence was also marred by Bo Xilai’s attempt to challenge him for the top leadership position in 2012. Bo, known to be an ambitious politician, ruled over the inland city of Chongqing and gained popularity as a populist leader who cracked down on crime and embraced China’s communist past. His arrest and trial just before Xi was elevated to the top position in the CCP was the country’s largest political scandal since the violent crackdown in 1989 against pro-democracy students in Tiananmen Square.
Given the conflict that marred his ascent, Xi may fear that any attempt to choose a successor or plan a transition would lead to open conflict among China’s elite. But the lack of transparency at the top of China’s political system has its own costs. It’s increasingly difficult to make sense of recent changes and happenings among China’s elite. The unprecedented purge of China’s top military officials since the beginning of Xi’s third term may indicate that his attempt to clean up corruption has failed despite more than a decade of hard work. However, the recent purges have targeted Xi’s own hand-selected men. What does this indicate about his ability to choose leaders wisely?
Ultimately the recent concerns about Xi’s health or a palace coup were put to rest when he resurfaced at a Politburo meeting in June, where new rules were announced to regulate the top coordinating commissions of the CCP. These commissions have been strengthened under Xi, and many have taken on roles previously performed by government agencies. Since 2018, Xi has assumed the chairmanship of many of them, indicating his centralization of power but also perhaps his lack of faith in others to lead.
That said, further institutionalization of these bodies may be part of a process of delegation, even—as some experts speculated—a move to transition power to the next generation. Without greater clarity from the top, however, it’s impossible to tell if Xi is planning to groom the next generation of leadership or further centralize power with rules that govern everyone but himself.
