Análisis Online Analysis IISS, 09.09.2026 Nigel Gould-Davies, exdiplomático y académico británico (IISS)
- Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner’s visit to Kyiv is a diplomatic win for Ukraine. But they still do not understand the nature of the war or what is needed to end it
The visit of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow on 5 September 2026, and to Kyiv the following day, marks a return to active American diplomacy to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. Intense efforts in the summer and autumn of 2025 were displaced after February 2026 by the war in the Middle East. This was thus their first visit to Moscow since January 2026 (though they met Kirill Dmitriev, President Vladimir Putin’s special envoy for foreign investment and economic cooperation, in Florida in March). It was also their first-ever trip to Kyiv as envoys.
The Kyiv leg of the trip was the only significant development. Confirmed just a day before they left Washington, it counts as a diplomatic success for Ukraine, which has long sought this. It also sets a precedent and establishes an expectation that any future visit to Moscow should be mirrored by one to Kyiv. Conversely, it was unwelcome to the Kremlin, which has sought to frame the war as an issue to be decided by Russia and the United States alone. Russia may have tried to prevent it by attacking Kyiv’s two main airports to prevent a direct flight from Moscow.
By contrast, the Moscow leg of the visit was Groundhog Day. Russia repeated the same formula as in previous rounds of fruitless talks: effusive warmth, maximalist demands and complete inflexibility. It continued to demand Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Donbas, limitations on the size of its armed forces, non-alignment in foreign policy, and ‘demilitarisation and denazification’ – that is, the imposition of a Kremlin-friendly regime. These demands remain unacceptable to the large majority of Ukrainians. Until they are scaled back, the continuation of the war is inevitable.
Russia’s hardening position
There is no sign of such a shift. On the contrary, in recent months Russia’s position has hardened. Firstly, Russian sources now insist that, in the event of an end to the war, Russian forces would continue to occupy Ukrainian territory beyond the regions it explicitly seeks to control. Secondly, Russia is diverting resources to missile production to exploit Ukraine’s lack of interceptors and subject Kyiv to severe attacks, with the threat of more over the winter. Thirdly, since May 2026 Russia has also stepped up its attacks on third-party-flagged vessels in the Black Sea carrying Ukrainian grain to world markets. Fourthly, Russian escalation extends beyond Ukraine. The discovery on 4 August of an explosive-packed drone near Ukrainian cargo planes at Leipzig/Halle Airport, a major NATO logistics hub, marks a new level of threat in Russia’s campaign of sub-threshold aggression against Europe.
These actions in turn reflect Putin’s frequently expressed confidence that Russia’s underlying economic and demographic advantage will enable it to outlast Ukraine’s defence and European support for it. But Russia, too, faces growing difficulties. Ukraine is inflicting enormous manpower losses, carrying out middle-range strikes that are suppressing Russian supplies to Crimea, and conducting long-range attacks on oil facilities that have compelled the introduction of widespread fuel rationing.
It is not clear how informed Putin is about these problems. He has repeatedly announced that Russian forces have taken towns and cities still controlled by Ukraine. Russia may be falling into an authoritarian trap, whereby a harshly repressive system creates strong incentives to exaggerate successes and conceal unwelcome truths from the leader. The result is flawed strategic decision-making.
Renewed US engagement
Other senior American officials recognise the difficulties that Russia faces and the threats it poses. Two weeks ago CIA Director John Ratcliffe visited Moscow, reportedly to warn Russia against escalating its sabotage campaign in Europe and to share the bleak US assessment of Russia’s position in the war. Last week US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov that sanctions would not be eased until the war had ended.
But Witkoff and Kushner – the officials closest to President Donald Trump – do not yet appear to understand the essential character of the war, and thus lack a coherent theory of how it could end. In particular, they have not grasped that this will require Russia to accept a settlement that gives it far less than the effective political control of Ukraine it seeks. Nor do they see that warning and constraint, not win–win, is the necessary idiom. Until they learn from the repeated failures of their talks with the Kremlin, any future visits are likely to be just as fruitless.
