Artículo Online Analysis, 24.07.2026 Nigel Gould-Davies, exdiplomático y académico británico (IISS)
Following mass protests, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has replaced Oleksandr Syrskyi with Mykhailo Drapatyi as chief of Ukraine’s armed forces. The outcome augurs well for Ukraine’s conduct of the war and its domestic stability.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s decision on 21 July 2026 to replace General Oleksandr Syrskyi with Major-General Mykhailo Drapatyi as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine capped a turbulent week in Ukraine’s military politics, and a tumultuous year of civic activism. The outcome leaves Ukraine better placed to press the advantages it has gained in the war with Russia. It also confirms the remarkable strengths of its civil society.
Change and more change
The latest crisis began on 15 July when Zelenskyy fired minister of defence Mykhailo Fedorov. Appointed only six months earlier with the boldest vision of any of Ukraine’s four wartime defence ministers, Fedorov had driven major reforms and a significant shift in Ukraine’s military fortunes: jeopardising Russia’s capacity to supply occupied Crimea, bringing the war home to ordinary Russians through fuel shortages and other effects, and inflicting higher battlefield losses. The question was always whether Fedorov’s transformative agenda would prevail over the resistant interests and mindset in senior Ukrainian military echelons. When Federov’s relationship with Syrskyi broke down irreparably, Zelenskyy was forced to choose between them, and retained Syrskyi.
Mass protests in Kyiv and other major cities, sparked by Fedorov’s sacking, have now pressured Zelenskyy into removing Syrskyi too. Fedorov has reportedly been offered another post in the government, but insists on his return as Minister of Defence. Protests look set to continue unless Zelenskyy agrees to this. Even if he does not, Drapatyi’s appointment is highly significant. The effect on morale will be immediate: Drapatyi, like Fedorov, is widely respected across Ukrainian society and the front line. More fundamentally, he represents, with Fedorov and Lieutenant-General Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Presidential Administration since January, the post-Soviet generation and mindset that Ukraine needs to instil across its institutions.
Rapid development, slower shift in culture
While Ukraine leads the world in rapid wartime innovation in the defence-industry ecosystem, tactics and operations, transformation in its military culture has been far more uneven. While some units and commanders have introduced important changes and are sharing their lessons, best practice remains the exception rather than the norm. Soviet-era practices – micromanagement rather than mission command, centralised control rather than devolving responsibility, avoidance rather than acceptance of responsibility for failure – remain entrenched, costing lives, hurting morale and undermining recruitment and training. A widespread view had set in that Syrskyi’s methods and approach had become a hindrance to Ukraine’s war effort. The eruption of an abuse scandal in June in the Skelya regiment, which reported directly to Syrskyi, further undermined his cause.
The appointment of Drapatyi alone will not solve this problem. Culture is the hardest thing to change, and will require both systemic reform and the removal of the most resistant senior officers. Much will depend on how far Zelenskyy supports this work. If Drapatyi succeeds, Ukraine may develop a dynamic, enabling military culture that is commensurate with its battlefield and defence sector innovations.
Civic strength
Drapatyi’s appointment also marks an anniversary. Exactly a year before, the Ukrainian Security Service began harassing Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), while a law was rapidly passed to strip the bodies of their independence. This triggered the biggest political crisis in Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion. Widespread demonstrations and diplomatic pressure from Western partners forced the authorities to reverse course within a week. The attempt to neuter NABU and SAPO was widely believed to have been motivated by concerns that their corruption investigations were probing senior political figures. In November 2025, Andriy Yermak, the previous head of the Presidential Administration and Zelenskyy’s closest political ally, resigned after the agencies conducted searches of his home.
The public mobilisations of July 2025 and July 2026 reveal remarkable qualities in the Ukrainian public and its relationship to power. Civil society has repeatedly shown that, despite the constraints of martial law, it can organise rapidly and effectively to secure the reversal or revision of counterproductive leadership decisions.
Its modus operandi can be described as anti-populism. Populism inflames division, demonises elites as enemies and exploits grievances rather than solves problems. Ambitious demagogues often lead it. It can be unruly and tinged – or worse – with violence. Ukraine’s public politics, by contrast, is leaderless. It unites diverse groups to hold the authorities to account and reverse mistakes. It is a loyal opposition that criticises but rarely condemns. It is disciplined, peaceful, yet implacable.
And it is effective. The president has responded to its demands. The results – the appointment of Budanov and Drapatyi, and perhaps Fedorov in some capacity – bode well for the continued transformation of Ukraine’s armed forces and its conduct of the war. They augur well, too, for Ukraine’s domestic stability. Its capacity to organise with such dignity in wartime, when grief and anger might be harnessed to destructive effect, attests a maturity that its partners might learn from.
